



These reflections concern limitations upon prevalent modes of
formulating and using legal theories. The analysis is predomi-
nantly contextual, focusing on the impact of legal 'future shock."
Other limitations stem from the author's reflections on "living"
theories, the linkage between theory and ideology, and the need
for humanistic legal theory.
PROLOGUE
Scene:
Law School Commencement Exercises
Actors:
The High Priest (Dean)
The Guest Preacher (Jurist)
The Grateful Graduates (Students)
The Chorus (Lawyers, including Law Professors)
The Proud Parents (People)
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The Guest Preacher:
"6... and so my friends, it is an appropriate moment to recall
and close with the guiding words of Mr. Justice Holmes: 'The life
of the law has not been logic but experience.'
The High Priest:
"Thank you Guest Preacher. Let us now award the diplo-





Aside quietly to the Grateful Graduates: "What does Juris'
mean?"
Grateful Graduates:
"Oh, maybe it has something to do with jurisprudence-you
know, legal theory and all that 'academic stuff."'
Proud Parents:
"We see. Just thought it mighe have something to do with the
law of life being experience as the Guest Preacher said."
Chorus:
• • ... ................*.*•  .... ........ .o.•... ... ................................. ...
From 1973 to 1975, Professor William Twining of the University
of Warwick Law School in Coventry, England and I co-taught a
comparative course in Anglo-American legal theory. The course
sought to introduce students to main currents of Anglo-American
jurisprudence through the writings of Bentham, Austin, Hart,
Pound, Fuller, Llewellyn, Lasswell, McDougal and others. These
reflections are the product of that teaching experience.'
The purpose of these reflections is to present an intentionally
argumentative "position paper" which in its broadest scope is
about the limits of theory. More particularly, these reflections fo-
cus on some limits on legal theory caused by the fact of signifi-
cant and swift cultural and societal change. In a sense, this is an
1. See generally Folsom & Roberts, The Warwick Story: Being Led Down the
Contextual Path of the Law, 30 . LEGAL EDUC. 166 (1979).
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exploratory environmental impact statement. As the intellectual
observer or reporter, I do not claim to be either comprehensive
(for legal theory covers vast fields of learning) or authoritative
(because, as a matter of faith, I don't believe there is a final word
on anything, except possibly death). I do claim to discern in
some legal theorists a certain absence of sensitivity to or aware-
ness of the twentieth-century environment in which they work
and the relevance of that environment to their studies. I also
think that all who deal with the law, especially law professors, are
theorists at one point or another.
Let's start with the word "theory." I perceive theory to be the
articulation of general or abstract principles, concepts or analyses
which are the product of contemplation or speculation about a
given or assumed set of "facts." Facts, as observational catego-
ries, are "theories" in their own right. Put crudely, then, theory is
most often a by-product of the collision of intellect and life. What
results is a model or hypothesis offered by theorists as a rational,
simplifying explanation of a pre-selected "factual" reality. Theo-
ries come in all sizes, shapes and packages. Some are grand theo-
ries purporting to explain vastly complex human or natural
phenomena. Others are finite with narrow areas of concern and
objectives. Still others are middling or second order theories,
neither grand or finite. But no matter how you subdivide or
otherwise label theories, they remain articulated by-products of
intellect and pre-selected "realities." Whether you consider legal
theory to be a branch of social theory or a branch of "natural"
theory, or whether you consider theories of law to be distinguish-
able from theories about law, is immaterial to this conclusion. In
this fundamental regard, legal theory is no different from theory
in general.
I am concerned about limitations upon prevalent modes of for-
mulating and using legal theories. My line of analysis is predomi-
nantly contextual. Legal thinkers sometimes fail to acknowledge
and account for "future shock" and other important considera-
tions in the formulation and use of legal theory. By "future
shock" I mean the acceleration in the rate of cultural and societal
change (including legal change) which we are all experiencing
and which has been so well described and publicized by Alvin
Toffler.2
2. See A. ToFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
Future Shock and Theory
Future shock has a number of effects on theory in general and
legal theory in particular which are often overlooked:
(1) Future shock undermines the rational process of theory formulation
by rendering "facts" exceedingly transient;
(2) Future shock shortens the useful life-span of a well articulated the-
ory; and
(3) Future shock increases the inherent tendencies of theorists to "build
castles in the sky" instead of on earth.
3
Take, for example, theories of marketplace competition that
abound in the field of antitrust, which happens to be my speciali-
zation. There are extensively developed theories of "perfect"
competition, 4 "monopolistic" competition,5 "destructive" competi-
tion,6 "workable" or "effective" competition7 and "non-distorted"
competition,8 to name the most familiar. All of these theories rep-
resent intellectual efforts to grapple with economic and legal "re-
alities" in the field of antitrust. As simplifying concepts in a
complex area of human behavior, they have subjective value as
intellectual exercises for theorists. They also have practical, more
objectively measurable social utility. These theories demonstrate
visible utility when and if, for example, they (1) impart direction,
clarity and understanding to immediate participants in legal
processes, including students, practitioners and law professors in
search of road maps through the maze called law, or (2) assist in
communication about legal affairs, or (3) enable laypeople to
identify with and understand the law and legal processes.
I would argue, however, that the utility of these theories and all
legal theory is both easily overestimated and deceptive. Why? In
part because future shock has not been given its due. In all of
these theories I see a search for lasting absolutes in a world of
change; I see decay in intellectual castles from the bottom up.
Viewed collectively, I see a plurality of theories which more
closely resemble the economic, legal and human realities of anti-
trust. This plurality thus has greater utility than any individual
3. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PAILOSoPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953).
4. I am referring to the economists' dream model of marketplace competition
found in any standard text. E.g., P. SAMuEIoN, EcoNomics (10th ed. 1976).
5. See, e.g., Mueller, Antitrust and Economics: A Look at "Competition," 10
ST, Louis U.L.J. 482 (1966).
6. See, e.g., D. BoIEs & P. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BusINEss 373-76
(1977).
7. See, e.g., the summary presented in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 315-42
(1955).
8. Non-distorted competition is the theoretical heart of European communi-
ties competition law. See R. FoisoM, CoRPoRATE COMPETrION LAw IN THE EuRo-
PEAN COmiuNrEs 31-52 (1978).
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theory. But pluralities change and decay rapidly too. If Toffler
and others are correct in their observations, are the benefits of
building and adding to such theories outweighed by their costs? I
invite replies. Would a disposal service for dated legal theories be
desirable? And who should be the sanitation engineers?
In this regard I do not see myself as anti-intellectual, just skep-
tically anti-theorist. There are alternatives to building and re-
building castles in the sky. I am talking about alternative ways
for lawyers and, especially, law professors and law students to
spend their time. Greater fact orientation (which, as I have sug-
gested, is also a theoretical species) is one alternative.9 While
armchair legal theory formulation may have been excusable in
the past, information retrieval and storage systems combined
with advanced social science analytical techniques now permit
and encourage fact orientation. Information overload, despite in-
creasing complexity, is simply much less a problem than ever
before. Information overload should not be a cause for retreats
from "fact" into "theory."
It is now possible, to continue my example, to measure and
quantify the marketplace realities of competition with considera-
ble sophistication. Thus it is often not necessary to speculate
whether a market reflects "workable," ".monopolistic" or "theory
X" competition when economists (and qualified lawyers) can rea-
sonably ascertain the state of competition in that market. Policy
planners and litigants may still usefully communicate in terms of
the "theories" of their cases, regulations or legislative proposals.
Laypersons may more readily identify with and understand anti-
trust law as a consequence of its theoretical underpinnings. Law
professors and law students will continue to communicate on a
theoretical plane which facilitates antitrust learning and research.
But it is increasingly the case that basic market "facts," before,
after, or while antitrust law is being enforced, altered or studied,
need not be the subject of theoretical speculation.
Theory Lives
Future shock is not the only perspective in these reflections. I
recognize and oppose the general tendency of theories to take on
9. This is not a new insight. American 'realists," sometimes characterized as
naive, have been saying much the same thing for years. See W. Twmio, KARL
LEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEMENT (1973).
lives of their own. While a "living" law or constitution may be de-
sirable, a "living" theory of law can be downiight dangerous. Le-
gal theories by their very nature represent simplified pictures of
legal processes. Moreover, legal theories are backward looking
abstractions-things which are already cut loose from present-
day life.
Theories thus distort from birth. Nurtured along by theorists,
legal theories can gradually assume lives of their own, more and
more distant from the "facts" upon which they were based. As
this process of "theorization" occurs, the potential for distortion
increases. Instead of constantly rechecking the observational ba-
sis of a theory, as a measure of its present utility, legal theorists
may prefer to theorize about theory. Grafts and transplants ap-
pear. Dialogue continues. Distance is achieved. At some point, a
legal theory can resemble a living being, lacking only a social se-
curity number. When living theories will die and who will issue
their death certificates are uncertain. One hundred and fifty
years passed before H.L.A. Hart was able to inter, in the opening
chapters of The Concept of Law,O some of the "command" theo-
ries of law of John Austin. In Kuhnian terms," the paradigm
finally changed. During the interim, the study of law suffered con-
siderably. Law was read, if you like, with the wrong blinders on.
And who is to say Austin's theories will not be reincarnated? Are
Hart's concepts of law necessarily better blinders? Should law
professors spend their time making blinders?
Ideology and Theory
Although the relationship between theory and ideology is virtu-
ally uncharted, I suspect there is at least one linkage which oc-
curs somewhere near the point when a legal theory takes on a life
of its own. I use the word "ideology" in the sense of generally
shared values or perspectives. Independent of the bases upon
which they were formulated, living legal theories may become le-
gal ideology.
Take, for example, contract theory and ideology. Law teachers,
lawyers and law students have long belabored the "bargain" or
"meeting of the minds" theories of contract. The hours spent in
these efforts are probably incalculable. Linkage of these theories
to the ideological value of "freedom of contract" is easily made.
Regardless of which is the chicken and which is the egg, too few
stopped to analyze the social and factual premises behind the
10. See HL.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
11. See generally T. KuHN, THE STRucTURE OF SciEEN c REvoLUoNs (2d ed.
1970).
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theory or the ideology.' 2 Only recently has recognition of the inci-
dence of standard form contracts or the impact of economic regu-
lation been acknowledged,' 3 revealing that in this century parties
to contracts do not often "bargain" or "meet each others' minds"
in offer and acceptance. Yet, in certain quarters, it may still be
considered heretical to question whether freedom of or to con-
tract is a shared value or shared experience in society.' 4 Some
law school courses in contracts are still skewed in these theoreti-
cal and ideological directions. Restructuring legal theory and law
courses is difficult. Restructuring legal ideology may be
impossible.
Theory and Life
The reader will by now have discerned that these reflections
contain a distinctly humanistic orientation. I would like to see
more focus on human affairs in legal theory and legal ideology. At
least since Freud, for example, few would deny that mankind fre-
quently acts in irrational, emotional ways. Yet relatively infre-
quent acknowledgement of this "fact" is to be found in Anglo-
American legal theory. I suggest that this is perhaps the case be-
cause law professors, jurists, lawyers and law students are so en-
gaged in rationally oriented intellectual processes that they
simply project these biases into their theories regardless of what
humans involved in legal processes are doing or feeling. Such a
reflection raises fundamental questions. Can rational, simplifying
legal theories ever adequately explain complex, individual and
group motivations and activities? Should such theories attempt to
deal with how people feel about law and justice? Does this kind
of acknowledgement intensify or dilute the impact of future
shock? Does it shorten or lengthen the half-lives of all or some
legal theories? Mere lawyers are not well prepared to begin to re-
solve these questions. I do believe intuitively, however, that
these lines of inquiry will reveal further limits on legal theory.
12. Compare CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1950), with WILIJSTON ON CONTRACTS
(1938).
13. See, e.g., Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith,
and Freedom of Contract A Comparative Study, 77 HAnv. L REV. 401 (1964); Ma-
caulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963).
14. See P.S. ATmYA, THE RISE AND FAL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); G.
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); The Relevance of Contract Theory: A
Symposium, 1967 Wis. L REV. 803.
Consider just one example: theories of fault in divorce proceed-
ings. Traditional common law and statutory concepts of fault
(adultery, non-support, drunkenness) are in a sense attempts to
rationally explain why a nuclear family unit should be given per-
mission to legally dissolve. Yet it is arguable that a family is es-
sentially not a rational human construct but rather exhibits
irrational, emotional human tendencies. The reality and experi-
ence of "family" include a wide range of complex, social and psy-
chological phenomena which theories of fault in divorce
proceedings tend to ignore. If we must retain theories of fault,
why not make "failure to love" a ground for divorce? Psychia-
trists, psychologists, social workers and other professionals could
give meaning to such a standard (which is, admittedly, a theoreti-
cal standard). I welcome, in the process of legal theory formula-
tion, any acknowledgement of the emotional and irrational
aspects of human affairs. Is there not room and need for an "un-
reasonable person" theory in tort law?
Some readers, true-believing theorists or those for whom legal
processes are "fact" and nothing else, may be discouraged by my
moderation. Following a middle road, I have tried to take a pro-
vocative position upon some limits on the use and formulation of
legal theory. I hope that others (especially other law professors),
familiar with different branches of law and legal theory, will find a
kernel of an idea (dare I say theory) in these reflections which
will cause them to reconsider how they spend their lives.
Chorus:
.......... ..............................................
